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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
S. ,V. DOWSE, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
FRED D. KAMMERMAN and 
VAUGHN D. KAMMERMAN, 
doing business as KAMMER-
MAN COMPANY, 
Appellants. 
CASE NO. 7719 
Brief of Appellants 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
S. W. Dowse, plaintiff and respondent, herein-
after called Respondent, instituted an action in the 
District Court of the State of Utah in and for Salt 
Lake County, against defendants and appellants, 
hereinafter called Appellants, to quiet title to Lot 7, 
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Block 1, Holland Subdivision, Salt Lake County, Utah, 
using the short form of complaint; to which Appel-
lants filed an answer and cross complaint. In its 
answer Appellants alleged ownership in fee, and 
possession, and denied Respondent's claim; and as 
a further and separate defense, Appellants pleaded 
equitable estoppel, setting out facts which they claim 
constitute equitable estoppel of Respondent. In its 
cross complaint, Appellants pleaded quiet title, using 
the simple form of complaint. 
At the trial of the case, the matters were sub-
mitted to the court, sitting without a jury, on an 
Agreed Statement of Facts, to which was attached 
as Exhibit A, a tax report for the year 1930, and also 
an abstract of title extended to March 28, 1951. 
These are a part of the designated record on appeal. 
The fact on which Appellants rely, as recited 
in the said Agreed Statement of Facts, are briefly as 
follows: 
One Charles E. Pittorf acquired the fee title to 
the property February 26, 1907. General taxes were 
paid each year to and including the year 1929. The 
taxes were not paid for 1930, and in due course the 
Treasurer of Salt Lake County executed a tax sale 
thereon, dated December 22, 1930, to Salt Lake 
County, a municipal corporation. Thereafter, gen-
eral taxes were added for the years 1931 to 1935, 
inclusive, amounting to $49.99 in all; and under 
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3 
date of March 31, 1936, Auditor's tax deed issued to 
Salt Lake County, a municipal corporation. 
Some nine years later, Salt Lake County sold 
the property to S. W. Dowse, Respondent herein, 
dated April 2+, 19+5, under authority of Title 80, 
Chapter 1 O, Section 68, Utah Code Annotated 1943. 
(See page 26 of abstract); and on June 13, 1945, S. 
W. Dowse, Respondent, and his wife, Pearl B. Dowse, 
sold said premises to Doris Trust Company, a Utah 
Corporation, Appellants' immediate predecessor 
in interest, conveying by quitclaim deed; which cor-
poration went into immediate possession, and such 
possession has continued to date of decree herein; 
that Appellants and their said predecessor in interest 
paid the general taxes on said property for the years 
1946 to and including 1949, four years, in the total 
amount of $10.61, and paid special assessment there-
on levied by Salt Lake City, in the sum of $93.04. 
While the consideration paid by Appellants for 
said property to said Doris Trust Company is not 
mentioned in the Agreed Statement of Facts, revenue 
stamps attached (page 28 of abstract) show a con-
sideration of $1000.00. 
From probate proceedings filed in 1950 in Salt 
Lake County, it appears that Charles E. Pittorf died 
July 12, 1912, leaving surviving him his widow and 
one daughter, both residing at the time in the State 
of Montana. On March 14, 1950, May G. Pittorf~ the 
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widow, executed a quit claim deed to said property to 
Respondent, for the consideration of $25.00, and on 
March 23, 1950, Grace P. Myers, the daughter of de-
ceased, executed a quit claim deed to Respondent for 
$10.00. Respondent thereupon caused to be probated 
the said estate of said deceased, and by virtue of said 
quit claim deeds, obtained an order of distribution 
to himself in said estate of said property and 
promptly thereafter filed the aforementioned suit 
to quiet title. 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS RELIED UPON 
1. The court erred in quieting title in Respond-
ent, and in not quieting title in Appellants. 
2. The court erred in not applying the principle 
of equitable estoppel against Respondent. 
3. The court erred in deciding that the facts did 
not constitute ground sufficient to invoke and apply 
the doctrine and principle of equitable estoppel 
herein. 
ARGUMENTS ON QUESTIONS INVOLVED 
As shown under the title "Estoppel," 19 Amer-
ican Jurisprudence, at p. 601, Estoppels are of three 
kinds: ( 1) By Record, (2) by deed, and (3) by 
matter in pais, the first two being sometimes referred 
to as technical estoppels as distinguished from equit-
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5 
able estoppels or estoppels in pais; and the author 
concerns himself only 'vith estoppels by deed and 
estoppels in pais. 
Under the discussion of Estoppel by Deed, and 
the sub-heading "Effect of Quitclaim," p. 606, ap-
pears the following: 
"Subject to qualification under special 
factual situations, it may be stated as a general 
principle that no estoppel arises from either 
making or accepting a quitclaim deed, except 
as to any right, title, or interest the grantor 
may have had or claimed at the time of con-
veyance. Such generalization is in full accord 
'vith the basic theory that a mere quitclaim 
is created ·where a deed is only a conveyance 
of the interest or title of the grantor in and 
to the property described, rather than of the 
property itself, and that a quitclaim passes 
all the right, title, and interest which a 
grantor has at the time of making the deed 
which is capable of being transferred by deed, 
unless a contrary intent appears, and nothing 
more." 
Appellants accept the foregoing statement, but 
assert that in the instant case the first clause, "sub-
ject to qualifications under special factual situations," 
should apply as warranted by the special factuals 
situations set forth herein. 
Appellants assert, also, that the principle of 
rquitable estoppel or estoppel in pais, or some appli-
cation of what has been tern1ed "quasi estoppe)s" 
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should be invoked in the instant case. Again quoting 
from Vol. 19, American Jurisprudence, page 633: 
Equitable estoppels operate in their own 
field as effectually as technical estoppels do 
in theirs. Since, however, the principle which 
underlies equitable estoppel in its proper sense 
runs throughout all the transactions and con-
tracts of civilized life, such estoppels cannot 
be subjected to fixed and settled rules of uni-
versal application, like legal estoppels, or ham-
pered by the narrow confines of a technical 
formula. In other words, each case of estoppel 
must in the nature of things stand on its own 
bottom." 
Further, 
Equitable Estopples are invoked to further 
equity and justice by preventing a party from 
asserting his rights under a technical rule of 
law when he has so conducted himself that it 
would be contrary to equity and good con-
science for him to allege and prove the truth. 
Grand Central Public Market v. U. S., 22 Fed. 
Sup. 119. 
The doctrine of Equitable Estoppel or 
quasi estoppel has been extended to prevent a 
wrong being done, when in good conscience 
and honest dealing, a party ought not to be per-
mitted to repudiate a previous statement, dec-
laration, or action. Robbins v. U. S., 21 Fed. 
Supp. 403. 
"Estoppel" is a special plea in bar which 
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7 
happens when a man has done some act or 
executed some deed which precluded him 
from averring anything to the contrary, but 
one \vho invokes the doctrine of estoppel must 
have acted in good faith. Winston v. Sauger-
tias Farms, 21 N.Y. Supp 2d 841. 
Estoppel exists when the party sought to 
be estopped, with full knowledge of all the 
facts bearing on the situation, takes a position 
which is inconsistent with one assumed later. 
Southern Pac. v. Industrial Commission, 91 
Pac. 2d. 700; 54 Ariz. 1. 
Under the doctrine of acquiesence or 
quasi estoppel, regularity or validity of act 
procured by one himself cannot be raised. 
John H. Spohn Co. Bender, 64 P 2d 152. 
Generally a party will not her permitted 
to take a position in regard to a matter which 
is directly contrary to, or inconsistent with, 
one previously assumed by him. Seifner v. 
vVeller, 171 S. W. 2d 617. Mo. case. 
"Estoppel" means the preclusion of a per-
son from asserting a fact by previous conduct 
inconsistent therewith, on his own part or the 
part of those under whom he claims, or by 
adjudication on his rights, which he cannot 
be allowed to call in question. Brisbon v. E. L. 
Oliver Lodge No. 335 of Brotherhood of Rail-
way Clerks, 279 N. W. 277. Neb. case. 
There is a species of "equitable estoppel" 
sometimes called quasi estoppel, which has its 
base in election, vvaiver, acquiesence or even 
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acceptance of benefits, and precludes a party 
from asserting to anothers disadvantage a 
right inconsistent with a position previously 
taken by such party, and no concealment or 
misrepresentation of existing facts on one side 
or ignorance thereof on the other are neces-
sary. Montclair Trust Co. v. Russel Co. 39 A 
2d 641, 135 N.J. Eq. 570. 
The doctrine of quasi estoppel has its basis 
in election, ratification, affirmance, acquies-
cense, or acceptance of benefits, and this princ-
ciple precludes a party from asserting, to an-
other's disadvantage, a right inconsistent with 
a position previously taken by him, and the 
doctrine applies where it would be uncon-
scienca ble to allow a person to maintain a 
position inconsistent with one in which he ac-
quiesced, or of which he accepted a benefit. 
Fed. Land B. of Omaha v. Houck, 4 NW. 2d 
213, 68 S. D. 449. 
Applying the principles set out in the foregoing 
to the case before the court: 
Respondent purchased the real property in-
volved, with other property, from Salt Lake County, 
a municipal corporation, and received a conveyance 
from said County as provided by statute. Respondent 
then sold the property so purchased to Appellants' 
immediate predecessor in interest for "$10.00 and 
other valuable consideration"-the exact price not 
being shown,-conveying by quitclaim deed (page 
27 abstract). 
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Section 78-1-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, de-
fines "conveyance" as follows: 
The term "conveyance" as used in this 
title shall be construed to embrace every in-
strument in writing by which any real estate, 
or interest in real estate, is created, aliened, 
mortgaged, encumbered, or assigned, except 
wills, and leases for a term of not exceeding 
one year. 
As stated in Pender v. R. L. Bird and Mae C. Bird, 
No. 7344 in the Supreme Court of Utah, 224 Pac. 2d 
105 7, the Court held, . . . 
That even assuming that the tax title 
from the county was defective, it gave the 
defendant R. L. Bird color of title which was 
clearly superior to the claim of record title 
asserted by plaintiff \'vhich was shown to be 
invalid. Thus, there was before the court a 
plaintiff with no vestige of title and defendants 
\vith color of title who '''ere in possession .... 
Notwithstanding the vestige of title of Respond-
ent, Appellants \'vere in possession of the premises 
under color of title purchased from Respondent and 
by reason of it, June 13, 1945; from which time 
Appellants and their predecessor in interest paid 
general and special taxes. 
In 1950 (after a series of recisions, holdings, 
among other things that failure to supply Auditor's 
affidavits constituted a defprt of title), the Respond-
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ent, apparently, .checked the record, found one such 
affidavit missing, sought out the heirs of the former 
title holder, obtained quitclaim deeds from them for 
a nominal consideration, to wit, $25.00 to one, and 
$10.00 to the other, filed probate proceedings, had 
distribution made to him on the strength of the said 
quitclaim deeds, and then brought the action to 
quiet title on the land he had theretofore sold for a 
valuable consideration. 
Was his conduct in conformity with equity and 
good conscience? Is his conduct not inconsistent 
with the position previously taken? A suit to quiet 
title being an equitable action, is he coming into 
court with clean hands? Did his action in purchas-
ing the property from the county and then selling it 
for a valuable consideration not constitute an acquies-
cence under the doctrine of quasi estoppel? Is he 
not .on the one hand retaining the price paid to him 
for the land, and on the other, trying to get the same 
land back on a technical rule of lavv? 
Appellants have been unable to find but few 
cases somewhat analogous to the one before the court. 
The following general statement is found in Vol. 51 
American Jurisprudence, page 979, Sec. 1137: 
Estoppel to Deny Validity of Title.-
The principles of equitable estopple in pais 
may be invoked against the owner of land 
which has been sold for taxes when he seeks 
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to attack the title of the purchaser at the tax 
sale. Their application in a particular case is 
determined by the general principles of es-
toppel. ... " 
In the instant case, the Respondent was the pur-
chaser at the tax sale, yet he himself is attacking his 
own tax title. 
In Ferguson vs. Etter~ 21 Ark. 160, 76 Am. Dec. 
361, 
At a sale for taxes, made by Sheriff, Nov. 
3, 1851, complainants and Maddux, the testa-
tor, became the purchasers, to whom deed 
"'as made, containing the usual recitals. 
At time of sale, Maddux was in possession 
under a lease from one Miller, who was the 
former owner; and after the sale, continued in 
possession until the day of his death, recogniz-
ing the validity of the sale and holding un-
der it. 
By will he devised his undivided interest, 
his devisees being defendants in the bill. 
The defense was that the sale for taxes 
Lvas void and did not divest the title of Miller, 
which the defendants allege is outstanding 
and paramount. 
Some of the objections relied on to impeach the 
validity of the sale relate to the assessment of the lots, 
others relating to the assessment for back taxes for 
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12 
a period anterior. to the formation of the State 
Government. 
The court held that, 
Whether well taken or not, it is imma-
terial to inquire, as the defendants are estopped 
to set them up .... it was lawful for Maddux 
to become purchaser of the premises, and hav-
ing become such purchaser jointly with com-
plainants, and the deed of the Sheriff to him 
and complainants, as tenants in common, be-
ing prime facie evidence of valid legal title, 
and having held the premises under the tax 
title thus acquired, and enjoyed the rents and 
profits, he could not have been heard to set 
up an outstanding title in a stranger, in order 
to defeat a petition (to partition). 
The case of Claybourne v. McLaughlin, 106 Mo. 
521, 27 Am. St. R. 369, was an action in ejectment 
to recover possession. 
Answer: General denial, estoppel and latches 
in bringing suit. 
The estoppel plea: The property was sold for 
delinquent taxes against plaintiff and purchased 
by S. A. Wright, and that defendants are in pos .. 
session, and claim title under mesne conveyances 
from him; that under the sale, there was a surplus of 
$76.81 after payment of taxes, which plaintiff de-
manded and received, thus ratifying the sale. 
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Defendants also alleged, in substance, that plain-
tiff with knowledge of all the facts, stood by for years 
and saw defendants and grantors enter into posses-
sion, and make valuable improvements. 
Some objections were made to the validity of the 
(tax) sale and deed. The Court found for the de-
fendants, holding, 
"It is a well recognized principle of law 
of estoppel that no person will be allowed to 
adopt that part of the transaction which is 
favorable to him, and reject the rest, to the 
injury of those from whom he derives the 
benefit, (citing Austin v. Loring, 63 Mo. 22). 
"When a sale of land is made, no person 
can be permitted both the money and the 
land. And it has been held, in the application 
of this principle, that it makes no difference 
whether the proceedings under which the 
sales occurs are voidable, or wholly void in 
consequence of want of jurisdiction . . .. that 
when those who are entitled to avoid a sale 
adopt and ratify it, by receiving the whole 
or any part of the purchase money, equity 
will preclude them from setting it aside sub-
sequently, for reasons that are too plain for 
statement .... The principle which these cases 
illustrate, and which is founded upon com-
mon honesty and good faith, is invoked in this 
defense. While the delinquent taxes were 
alien on this land, it was also an obligation 
resting up plaintiff personally, which good 
citizenship required them to discharge. This 
they neglected to do. The land was sold to 
satisfy the charge. . . 
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To permit plaintiffs to affirm the sale, 
and hold the proceeds in one hand, and reject 
the sale, and take the land with the other 
would be an encouragement of bad faith 
which courts of equity will not allow. 
Respondent was presumed to know the defect, 
yet he sold what he knew to be a defective title for a 
valuable consideration, pocketed that consideration, 
put the buyer into possession, stood by for several 
years, let the buyer from him pay the taxes, both 
general and special, and then when the property had 
increased in value, slipped around and bought up 
for a nominal consideration the record title from the 
ones who had neglected for twenty years to pay any 
taxes (by reason of which he bought the title from 
Salt Lake County), then after obtaining the record 
title, brought an action to repudiate his former action 
and repossess the land. 
Appellants assert that this case may be deter-
mined, not by extensive citing of analagous cases-
there being few to be found of similar import-but 
by review of the agreed facts, and by the application 
of plain principles of equity. 
We therefore contend that the judgment ap-
pealed from should be reversed and that entry of 
judgment for Appellants should be ordered. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID A. WEST, 
Attorney for Appellants. 
' 
1 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
